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ters could be taken into consideration as a basis for the conclusion. (Crater· v. Crater, 135 Cal. 633, 634 [67 P. 1049].)
No abuse of discretion has been shown.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and
Spence, .T., concurred.
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.

[S. F. No. 18481.

In Bank.
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SAFEWAY S'l'ORES, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent,
v. RETAIL CLEHKS IN'fERNA'fiONAL ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants.
[1] Labor-Collective Bargaining-Bargaining Representatives.Store managers of grocery chain store system are supervisors
or agents of management within purview of Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stats. 136, § 101), amending
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (29 U.S.C. §§ 151-159)
and removing supervisors from classification of employees for
collective barg·aining purposes.
[2] !d.-Collective Bargaining-State ControL-By exclusion of
supervisory employees and regulation of their collective bargaining rights from N a tiona! Labor Relations Act, the field as
to them is left open to state control.
[3] !d.-Collective Bargaining-Jurisdiction of Court or Board.State court has jurisdiction, independent of any determination
by National Labor R.elations Board that store managers are
supervisors, to regulate or enjoin activities of retail clerks'
unions for purpose of requiring store managers to be included
in labor contracts of clerks with employer; and since state
court can act, it has jurisdiction to determine facts on which
its jurisdiction depends.
[ 4] Id.- Collective Bargaining- Bargaining Representatives.Right of self-organization and of selection of a bargaining
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Labor, § 26; Am.Jur.,
Labor, § 96 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 8] Labor, §3a; [5] Labor, §20a;
[6] Courts, § 90; [7] Contracts, § 48; [9] Labor, §§ 20a, 25.
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t'epresentative are rights which exist independently of labor
relations acts, and existing right includes union organization
and traditional peaceful strike for higher wages.
[5] !d.-Concerted Union Activity.-Concerted union activity for
an objective which is not reasonably related to any legitimate
interest of organized labor will be enjoined.
[6] Courts-Decisions-Power of Courts-Scope of Determination.
-While questions of public policy are primarily for legislative
department to determine, when neither Constitution nor Legislature has spoken on subject the courts may make the declaration.

[7] Contracts-Legality-Public Policy.-The term "public policy"
is inherently not subject to precise definition; it is as broad
as question of what is fraud, and has been defined as anything
which tends to undermine that sense of security for individual
rights which any citizen ought to feel is against public policy.
[8] Labor-Collective Bargaining-Bargaining Representatives.Since store managers are agents of management, when so acting
they owe undivided loyalty to their principal and should be
kept free from divided loyalty that would be engendered by
compulsory membership in retail clerks' local unions; an employee union may not properly insist that a representative of
employer be required to participate in its deliberations under
union rules and thus divide his loyalty.
[9] !d.-Concerted Union Activity: Injunctive Relief.-Activities
of retail,. clerks' union in picketing or striking for purpose of
requiring inclusion of store managers in clerks' collective bargaining contract with employer are not reasonably related to
any legitimate interest of organized labor and, not being in
furtherance of any proper labor objective, are as a matter of
sound public policy enjoinable within equity jurisdiction of
court.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County. Ralph E. Hoyt, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to enjoin strike activities of certain unions.
ment granting preliminary injunction, affirmed.

Judg-

James F. Galliano, C. Paul Paduck, Benjamin Dreyfus and
Alexander H. Schullman for Appellants.
Roland C. Davis, J. D. Burdick, Carroll, Davis & Freidenrich as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants.
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Mitchell T. Neff, \Villard S. ,Johnston, B. H. Parkinson, .Jr.,
Orrick, Dahlquist, Neff & Herrington, John B. Rosson, Brown,
Rosson & Berry and Edward E. Mitchell for Respondent.
Iddings, Jeffrey, \Veisman & Rogers and Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
SHENK, J.~This is an action to enjoin strike activities
of the defendant unions. A preliminary injunction issued.
The defendants have appealed.
The controversy leading to the commencement of the action
arose after the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947 ( 61 Stats. 136, § 101), amending the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-167),
and removing supervisors from tl1e classification of employees
as defined in the act. 'l'he problem concerns the effect of
the Labor Management Relations Act on the right of the
defendant local unions to recog·nition as the bargaining agents
for the plaintiff's local store managers for the purpose of
coercing the inclusion of store managers in the retail clerks'
collective bargaining contract with the employer.
The plaintiff, herein referred to as Safeway, is a corporation engaged in the business of owning and operating retail
food stores throughout the United States. For the purposes
of this case it is engaged in interstate commerce. The defendants are the Retail Clerks International Association, an
unincorporated association, the affiliated state association, and
the local clerks' unions of Alameda and Contra Costa counties
in this state.
Seventy-six of Safeway's stores are located in the counties
mentioned. In each store a manager and from four to 2;~
clerks and butchers are employed. Each store stocks some
1,800 different food and household items and daily sales run
from $700 to $3,000. The clerks belong to their retail clerks'
local unions. rrhe butchers belong to their separate union.
In addition other employees, such as deliverymen, belong to
tlwir own union. Each store is separate geographirally from
the others and each has its individual store manager.
Beginning in 1937 and until September 19, 1949, clerks
and store managers were mem hers of the cleffmdant local
unions under current labor contracts. It is assumed that prior
to the present controversy the nnions were the eertified bargainillg representatives of the store managers and clerks
1mder the National I1abor Relations Act. Before tbe expira-
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tion of the last contract on the above date in 1949 certain
wage increases were demanded. During the course of the
negotiations the plaintiff announced that local store managers
would no longer be included in the labor contract. On September 19, 1949, one of the defendant local unions instituted
a strike and began picketing. vVage increases for store managers and clerks were settled on October 19th and were put
into effect by Safeway on October 26th. Upon the refusal
of Safevvay to include store managers in the contract or to
recognize the clerks' unions as the representatives of the
store managers, the other union then struck. The strike and
picketing continued until the commencement of this action
in November, 1949. A hearing on the order to show cause
was had on the verified complaint, numerous affidavits, and
oral testimony. It consumed 76 court days and resulted in the
issuance of the preliminary injunction on March 22, 1950.
As material here the trial court's order enjoined the defendants from engaging in concerted activities to induce or
compel the plaintiff to require union membership of its store
managers in the local unions or to bargain to that end with
the store managers or with the unions on their behalf. These
provisions of the order are based on the facts disclosed at
the hearing and the conclusions of the court drawn therefrom
that the store managers are supervisors within the meaning
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. The propriety of that conclusion and of the action of the trial court
on the record are the questions presented.
There are, of course, no findings as such at this stage of
the proceeding. They follow appropriately after the trial
of the action. The facts, for present purposes, are disclosed
by the allegations of the verified complaint, the averments
of numerous affidavits, other documentary evidence, and the
oral testimony. It was for the trial court to resolve any
conflicts in the evidence.
In the opinion of the trial court, which has been made
a part of the record (rule 5 (a) of Rules on Appeal), it is
stated: (1) that the store managers (referred to generally
by the plaintiff as location managers, and by the defendants
as managing clerks), are supervisory employees who act as
agents of management entrusted with the formulation and
execution on behalf of management of substantial matters
involving judgment and policy; (2) that no issue was presented concerning the wages, hours or working conditions of
the clerks or the store managers; (3) that the object of the
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strike was to compel Safeway to bargain and contract with
the clerks' union concerning membership of its store managers
in the defendant local unions; ( 4) that the strike was not
a jurisdictional strike as contended by Safeway and as denounced by section 1118 of the Labor Code of this state;
( 5) that the bylaws of the local unions provide that" only members not having the right to hire or fire shall be eligible to,
or shall hold, office''; that ''any member who is guilty of
improper conduct . . . shall be fined, suspended or expelled'' ;
( 6) that the executive boards of the two local unions are
vested with the ''power to . . . discipline any member by
fine, removal from employment or other penalty . . . for
conduct wh-ich tends to undermine the purposes for which
the union is formed"; (7) that the constitution of the Retail
Clerks' International Association contains substantially the
same provisions and in addition provides that ''it shall be
the duty of members of every local union individually and
collectively to do all in their power to advance the cause of
organized labor . . . '' ; ( 8) that each store manager has the
final decision as to whether clerks shall be employed to
work or shall continue to work in the store of which he is
manager; ( 9) that violence, intimidation and coercion on the
part of pickets of defendant local unions have occurred in such
a way as to indicate their recurrence unless restrained by
an appropriate order; (10) that the purpose of the picketing
is to further an objective which is contrary to the public
policy of the state and therefore unlawful; imd ( 11) that the
plaintiff is suffering serious damage as a result of the defendants' activities. There is an abundance of evidence to
support the foregoing statements of fact and conclusions.
It is contended by the defendants that the trial court
had no jurisdiction to act on the subject matter of the complaint and that exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the National I_jabor Helations Board. 'l1 he history of the federal
legislation on the subject may be resorted to in considering
the effect of the changes in the la-vY. It may be assumed that
before the enactments of 1947 the subject matter of the
controversy was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Bnt the changes compel an
opposite conclusion.
Section 2 ( 3) of the act of 1947 excludes from the definition
of ''employee'' ''any individual employed as a supervisor.''
Section 2 ( 11) states that the "term 'supervisor' means any
individual having authority, in the interest of the employer,
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to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly
to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing
the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the usc of independent judgment."
The evidence is overwhelming to the effect that the local
store managers have authority in the interest of their employer to direct the activities of employees under their supervision, to effectively make recommendations in disciplinary
matters and to hire and discharge the clerks. Both sides concede that store managers perform the duties of clerks when
necessary or in their spare time. [1] The record, however,
supports the conclusion that the store managers act as agents
of management in substantial and important matters of judgment and policy. The inclusion of detailed evidentiary matter
in this respect is unnecessary in view of decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board in similar cases that such store
managers are supervisors. (National Tea Co., 89 N.L.R.B.
No. 148, N.L.R.B. Decisions ( OOH), par. 9922, 1950; Re
Safeway Stores, Inc., 59 N.L.R.B. 936, 938 (1944).) In November 1949, in related cases involving Safeway in neighboring counties the National J_,abor Relations Board ordered the
clerks' union not to bargain collectively with Safeway by demanding as a condition the inclusion of store managers. That
order implies a holding that the store managers are supervisors. 'in Ohio Power Co. v. N.L.R.B. (1949), 176 F.2d 385,
388, it was said that § 2 (11) covers any individual having
authority responsibly to direct; that it ''does not require the
exercise of the power described for all or any definite part of
the employee's time. It is the existence of the power which
determines the classification.'' In that case the court ordered
that the board's certification of representatives entered prior
to the effective date of the Labor Management Relations Act
be set aside to the extent that supervisory employees involved
were included in the unit, and that the certification be amended
to exclude them from the unit.
[2] By the exclusion of supervisory employees and the
regulation of their collective bargaining rights from the
federal act the field as to them was left open to state control.
(Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board,
315 U.S. 740 [62 S.Ot. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154]; cf. Gerry of California v. Superior Court, 32 Oal.2d 119 [194 P.2d 689] .)
[3] Therefore, the contention that the state court has no juris-
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diction until the National Labor Relations Board in the first instance determines that store managers are supervisors is without merit; and since the state court can act, it has the jurisdiction to determine the facts upon which its jurisdiction depends. (Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460,
464 [171 P.2d 8]; appeal dismissed, 331 U.S. 549 [67 S.Ot.
1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666] .) In the present case the jurisdictional
fact that store managers are supervisors has been determined
with evidentiary support adversely to the defendants' contention.
The question then is as to the rights of the clerks' unions
under state law to engage in concerted activities against Safeway for the purpose of requiring store managers to be included in the labor contract of the clerks.
The federal amendatory act neither enlarges nor limits the
existing fundamental rights of supervisors. What it does
is to unclassify supervisors as employees under federal and
state acts regulating the exercise of employees' collective bargaining rights, coupled with the inhibition against compulsions on the employer engaged in interstate commerce to
include supervisors as employees for the purpose of such acts.
The decisional and other authorities define existing fundamental labor rights. [4] The right of self-organization and
of selection of a bargaining representative are rights which
exist independently of labor relations acts. The existing right
includes union organization for the conduct of collective bargaining and the traditional peaceful strike for higher wages.
(See 'l'orts, Restatement, § 784.) It was characterized and
recognized as a fundamental right long before it was protected under the National Labor Relations .Act and similar
state acts. (International Union v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, 259 [69 S.Ot. 516, 93 L.Ed. 651] ;
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &; Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 [57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 .A.L.R.
1352] ; see, also, International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454,
457 [70 S.Ct. 781, 94 L.Ed. 978].) It was the regulation of
this fundamental right of the labor supervisory personnel
formerly included within the federal act that the 1947 amendatory provisions left to the states for separate classification
and regulation.
[5] It is undisputed that concerted union activity for an
objective which is not reasonably relatec1 to any legitimate
interest of organized labor will be enjoined. It was said in
.Jarnes v. Marins hip Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721 at page 728 [155
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P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900]; "It should be recognized at the
outset that a union may use the various forms of concerted
action . . . to enforce an objective that is reasonably related
to any legitimate interest of organized labor . . . (citing
cases). It is equally well settled that the object of concerted
labor activity must be proper and that it must be sought by
lawful means, otherwise the persons injured by such activity
may obtain damages or injunctive relief." In that case the
plaintiff employees successfully sought the exercise of the
equity powers of the court to control the activities of fellow
employees and management contrary to the rights of the
plaintiffs. Those rights were not protected or controlled by
any statutory regulation. So here the equity jurisdiction
of the court was invoked by the plaintiff to be protected
against unjustifiable coercion on the part of one group of its
employees concerning a matter which also was not the subject of any statutory regulation or control and was contrary
to the rights of the plaintiff.
The trial court concluded that the union activity was contrary to public policy and therefore unlawful. One of the
questions presented is whether it has appropriately done so.
[6] It is true that questions of public policy are primarily
for the leg·islative department to determine. But it is also
true that when neither the Constitution nor the Legislature
has spoken on the subject the courts may make the declaration.
In cases without number the state courts have declared
contracts, transactions and activities of individuals, associations and corporations to be contrary to public policy where
their legislative departments have not spoken on the subject.
One of the latest restatements of the rule is by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Building Service etc. Union v.
Gazzam (1949), 339 U.S. 532 [70 S.Ct. 784, 94 L.Ed. 1045],
where it was said at page 536: "The public policy of any
state is to be found in its constitution, acts of the legislature,
and decisions of its courts. 'Primarily it is for the lawmakers
to determine the public policy of the state.' Twin City Pipe
Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 [51 S.Ct.
476, 75 L.Ed. 1112]."
This court has within recent years declared the public
policy of the state within the particular field here involved.
(James v. Marinship Cm·p., supra (1944), 25 Ca1.2d 721;
IIttghes v. Superior Court (1948), 32 Cal.2d 850 [198 P.2d
885], affirmed 339 U.S. 460 [70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985] .)
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[7] The term "public policy" is inherently not subject to
precise definition. In Maryland CastwUy Co. v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 71 Cal.App. 492, the court stated at page 497
!236 P. 210] : "The question, what is public policy in a given
case, is as broad as the question of what is fraud.'' Also in
Noble v. Palo .Alto, 89 Cal.App. 47, the court said at pp.
50-51 [264 P. 529] : "Public policy is a vague expression, and
few cases can arise in which its application may not be disputed. Mr. Story, in his work on Contracts ( § 546), says:
'It has never been defined by the courts, but has been left
loose and free of definition in the same manner as fraud.'
By 'public policy' is intended that principle of law which
holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.
. . . Public Policy means . . . anything which tends to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of
personal liberty or private property, which any citizen ought
to feel is against public policy . . . . "
[8] Since on this record store managers are agents of
management, when so acting they owe undivided loyalty to
their principal. As members of the defendant unions they
would under union rules be in duty bound to advance the
cause of the community of interest of store managers and
clerks in any dispute or disagreement with their principal.
They would be under constant apprehension of the penalties
under union rules, such as fines, suspension, or expulsion.
It is eminently proper that management supervisors, the store
managers in this case, be kept free from the divided loyalty
that would be engendered by compulsory membership in the
defendant local unions. Under the law an employer may not
demand that his representatives sit in the inner councils of
labor and thus be placed in the position of exerting his influence in directing labor's policies and activities. If such
au objective were recognized and were accomplished collective
bargaining would be in confusion and indeed futile. By the
same token an employee union may not insist that a representative of the employer be required to participate in its deliberations under union rules and thus divide his loyalty.
[9] Confronted with the responsibility of declaration
where as here there is no constitutional or legislative guide
on the subject we hold that the trial court was correct in
deciding that the coercion sought to be exercised by the defendants under the circumstances of this case was not reasonably related to any legitimate interest of organized labor;
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that the activities of the defendants were not in the furtherance of any proper labor objective, and that as a matter of
sound public policy were enjoinable within the equity jurisdiction of the court.
The judgment is affirmed.
Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTEl~, J.-I dissent.
The majority holds that the federal law (Labor Management Relations Act) has no bearing on this case and that
the question is one of state law. \Vith that I agree.
The sole question, as put by the majority opinion, is
whether the public policy of this state forbids the representation in collective bargaining of supervisory employees by a
union composed of the rank and file employees. The majority
opinion holds that public policy does prohibit such representation, and, as a corollary thereof, that concerted activity by
the union to compel such representation is for an unlawful
object and therefore enjoinable. I am not concerned with
the latter question because I do not believe such representation is against the public policy of this state. Indeed, the
public policy as expressed by the Legislature is directly to
the contrary. The statute states: "[T] he public policy of
this State is declared as follows:
"Negotiation of terms and conditions of labor should result from voluntary agreement between employer and employees. Governmental authority has permitted and encouraged employers to organize in the corporate and other
forms of capital control. In dealing with such employers, the
individual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual
liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and
thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment. Therefore it is necessary that the individual workman
have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate
the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall
be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.'' (Emphasis added; Lab. Code,
§ 923.) Thus an employee shall have the right to bargain
collectively through a representative of h~s own choosing.
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Here the rank and file union is the representative chosen by
the store managers and to hold that they may not choose
such representative is contrary to section 923, supra. There
is no qualification on the term "employee" in section 923.
Therefore it embraces supervisory as well as nonsupervisory
employees. It has been held that a mine superintendent is
an employee within the meaning of the labor laws (Davis v.
Morris, 37 Cal.App.2d 269 [99 P.2d 345]), and it has been
held repeatedly that supervisory employees came within the
term "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act
until it was amended in 1947 to expressly exclude them
from the term. (L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 163 F .2d 905; National Labor
Relat1:ons Board v. Swift & Co., 162 F.2d 575; Wells, Inc. v.
Nat'ional Labor Relations Board, 162 F.2d 457; Packard Motor
Car Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 485
[67 S.Ct. 789, 91 L.Ed.1040] .) In the Packard case, it was held
that supervisory employees were ·within the term ''employee''
used in the National Labor Relations Act and hence entitled
to the benefits of the act, that is, to have the employer bargain collectively with an association formed to represent
them in such bargaining, the court stating: ''The point that
these foremen are employees both in the most technical sense
at common law as well as in common acceptance of the term,
is too obvious to be labored. The Company, however, turns
to the Act's definition of employer, which it contends reads
foremen out of the employee class and into the class of
employers. (Section 2 (2) reads: 'The term ''employer'' includes any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly. . . . ' 49 Stat. 450. The context of
the Act, we think, leaves no room for a construction of this
section to deny the organizational privilege to employees because they act in the interest of an employer. Every employee,
from the very fact of employment in the master's business,
is required to act in his interest. He owes to the employer
faithful performance of service in his interest, the protection
of the employer's property in his custody or control, and all
employees may, as to third padies, a.ct in the interests of the
employer to such an extent that he is liable for their wrongful
acts . . . . "
"Even those who act for the employer in some matters,
including the service of standing between management and
man1ral labor, st?:ll have interests of their own as employees.
41 C.2d-19
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1'hmtgh the foreman is the faithful representative of the
employer in maintaining a prodttction schedttle, his interest
properly rnay be adverse to that of the employer when it
comes to fixing his own wages, hmtrs, seniority rights or work·ing condit1:ons. He does not lose his 1·ight to serve himself in
these respects because he se1·ves his master in others . . . .
"The company's argument is really addressed to the undesirability of permitting foremen to organize. It wants
selfless representatives of its interest. It fears that if foremen combine to bargain advantages for themselves, they
will sometimes be governed by interests of their own or of
their fellow foremen, rather than by the company's interest.
'I' here is nothing new in this argument. It is rooted in the
misconception that because the employer has the right to
wholehearted loyalty in the performance of the contract of
employment, the employee does not have the right to protect
h1:s independent and adver·se interest in the terms of the contract itself and the conditions of work. But the effect of the
National Labor Relations Act is otherwise, and it is for
Congress, not for us, to create exceptions or qualifications at
odds with its plain terms.
"Moreover, the company concedes that foremen have a right
to organize. What ·it denies is that the statute compels it to
recognize the 1mion. In other words, it wants to be free to
fight the foremen's union in the way that companies fought
other unions before the Labor Act. But there is nothing in
the Act which indicates that Congress intended to deny its
benefits to foremen as employees, if they choose to believe
that their interests as employees would be better served by
organization than by individual competition. . . .
"It is also urged upon us most seriously that unionization
of foremen is from many points bad industrial policy, that
it puts the ttnion foreman in the position of serving two
masters, divides his loyalty and makes generally for bad relat?:ons between management and labor. However we might
appraise the force of these arguments as a policy matter, we
are not authorized to base decision of a question of law upon
them. They concern the wisdom of the legislation j they cannot
alter the meaning of otherwise plain provisions." (Emphasis
added; Packard JJ1otor Car Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 330 U.S. 485, 488-493 [67 S.Ct. 789, 91 hE d. 1040].)
IJikewise in the present case, section 923, supra, by the use
of the term "employee" without qualification includes supervisory employees, namely, the store managers, and the Legis-
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lature has declared that such employees shall have the right
to bargain collectively with a representative of their own
choosing. Hence they may choose the rank and file union
as their representative. The Legislature has so declared and
this court is not authorized to declare a contrary policy as
does the majority here.
It may be suggested that the managers are entitled to
form their own union separate from the rank and file union
and have it represent them in bargaining, but they cannot,
as here, have the rank and file union as their representative.
The majority opinion does not discuss this question but the
clear implication is that it would be unlawful for a union
of managers to bring concerted action to compel the employer
to bargain with it. In the first place, there is no such limitation
in section 923, supra. It is left solely to the supervisory
employees to decide who shall represent them and that includes
either a managers' union or rank and file union.
In regard to a distinction, if any, between the right to barg·ain through a managers' union or a rank and file union,
the majority opinion in summarizing its holding, states :
''Since on this record store managers are agents of management when so acting they owe undivided loyalty to their
principal. As members of the defendant unions they would
under union rules be in duty bound to advance the cause of
the community of interest of store managers and clerks in any
dispute or disagreement with their principal. They would
be under constant apprehension of the penalties under union
rules, such as fines, suspension, or expulsion. It is eminently
proper that management supervisors, the store managers in
this case, be kept free from the divided loyalty that would
be engendered by compulsory membership in the defendant
local unions. Under the law an employer may not demand
that his representatives sit in the inner councils of labor
and thus be placed in the position of exerting his influence in
directing labor's policies and activities. If such an objective
were recognized and were accomplished collective bargaining
would be in confusion and indeed futile.'' The same arguments there made would apply regardless of whether a rank
and file union or managers' union was the representative of
the managers because the latter union would have its rules
and threats of suspension for any member who was not loyal
to the union's cause of obtaining the best terms of employment possible for its members. Its interests would conflict
with the employer's interests the same as the interests of a
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rank and file union. It should be observed that the majority
opinion refers to the "compulsory membership" of the managers in the rank and file union. As far as appears, the managers are not being compelled to belong to the rank and file
union and have it as their representative. They are willing
and want to join such union and have such representation.
This brings us to the question of whether there is or should
be any public policy against the formation and use, as a bargaining representative, of a union by the managers alone.
From what I have stated above, it clearly appears that the
policy, as stated by the Legislature (Lab. Code, § 923, supra),
authorizes such representation. Aside from the Legislature's
declaration, however, it should be clear that the policy favors
such representation. The soundness of that proposition is
demonstrated by the decision in Packard Motor Car Co. v.
Labor Board, 330 U.S. 485, quoted supra. Moreover, such
representation is not new in the law. In the newspaper and
job printing field, foremen have been members of the rank
and file unions since 1889. (See 55 Yale L.,J. 772.) The same
is true in other industries such as building trades, metal
trades, and railroads. (Collective Bargaining by Foremen,
12 Labor Relations Reporter, 421, May, 1943, Bureau of National Affairs.) In National Labor Relat,ions Board v. Edward
G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571, 577, cert. denied 335 U.S.
908 [69 S.Ct. 411, 93 hEel. 441], the court in discussing the
claim that the Labor Management Relations Act (1947 amendment) was unconstitutional as to foremen because they were
excluded from its protection, held the act constitutional but
said: ''The right of employees to form labor organizations
and to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing with employers has long been recognized.
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1,
33, 34, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352."
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.
Traynor, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November
12, 1953. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

